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Violence and Revolutionary Subjectivity
Marx to i ek
Christopher J. Finlay
University College Dublin, cfinlay{at}usa.net
The purpose of this article is to explore the relationship between revolution and violence in Marxism and in a series of texts drawing on Marxian theory. Part 1 outlines the basic normative frameworks which determine the outer limits of permissible violence in Marxism. Part 2 presents a critical analysis of a series of later discussions - by Sorel, Fanon and i ek - which transformed the terms in which violence was discussed by developing one particular aspect of Marxist thought. By teasing out the implications of revolutionary theory for the commission and permission of violence, it is possible to specify those points at which it tends towards excess. This in turn points towards limits that an adequate normative theory of revolutionary violence should establish.
Key Words: Benjamin communism Engels Fanon Lukács Marx revolution Sartre Sorel terrorism violence i ek
European Journal of Political Theory, Vol. 5, No. 4,
373-397 (2006)
DOI: 10.1177/1474885106067277

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