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Within the Limits of Deliberative Reason Alone

Habermas, Civil Disobedience and Constitutional Democracy

Queen Mary College, University of London

In this article, I take Habermas's treatment of civil disobedience as a litmus test of the way in which Habermas relates to the imperfectness of democracy. The case of civil disobedience, which Habermas deems to be a normal part of a mature constitutional democracy, shows that Habermas is ultimately unable to submit all decisions and distinctions to the public use of reason as envisaged in his deliberative account of democracy. As a consequence, I argue that we must take the imperfectness of democracy as constitutive and our conceptualization of civil disobedience and democracy must start from there. The reading of Habermas and the argument for an alternative approach are inspired by the work of Jacques Derrida, central to which is an idea of democracy and justice ‘to-come’ focusing our attention on the performative role of civil disobedience in creating more legitimate laws.

Key Words: civil disobedience • deconstruction • deliberative democracy • Derrida • Habermas

European Journal of Political Theory, Vol. 6, No. 2, 200-218 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/1474885107074350


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